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 aidin        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2222 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMAL ANTHONY, 
 
                  Appellant 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court  No. 1-09-cr-00179-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo                              
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  January 20, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 On or about April 2, 2009, Jamal Anthony, at the request of his friend 
Brandon Wallace, distributed 13.3 grams of crack cocaine to Corey Dickerson, an 
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undercover officer with the Dauphin County Criminal Investigation Division.  
Thereafter, a two-count indictment charged Brandon and Anthony with distributing 
and possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams of cocaine base and marijuana 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and aiding and abetting the same in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count I), and conspiracy to distribute five grams and more of 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count II).   
Anthony maintained his innocence and proceeded to trial.  The government 
presented, inter alia, the testimony of Officer Dickerson, who identified Anthony 
as the person from whom he purchased the crack cocaine, Detective Jason Paul, 
who conducted the surveillance video, and Anthony’s co-conspirator Wallace.  
Near the end of the government’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for a judgment 
of acquittal on Count I because the government had not adduced any evidence to 
show that Anthony had distributed 50 grams or more of cocaine.  The Court noted 
that the “jury could find less than that.”  Defense counsel acknowledged as much, 
but urged the Court to dismiss the charge to the extent it alleged that 50 grams or 
more had been distributed.  The government acceded to that request, but asked for 
a finding of five grams or more.  The Court granted the motion.  Thereafter, the 
defense presented two witnesses.  No rebuttal was offered.  The jury found 
Anthony guilty on Count I with respect to the distribution of cocaine base of five 
grams or more, and the conspiracy offense charged in Count II.  At sentencing, the 
Court granted a one-level downward variance in recognition of the disparity 
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between crack and powder cocaine, yielding a guidelines range of 84 to 105 
months, and sentenced him to 105 months of imprisonment.  This timely appeal 
followed, challenging Anthony’s conviction on several grounds and seeking to set 
aside his sentence.1
Anthony submits that his conviction should be set aside because of a Batson 
violation.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 467 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986).  The record 
demonstrates that while the parties were exercising their peremptory challenges, 
the defense asked the government to state its race-neutral reason for striking one of 
the two African-American venirepersons.  Before the District Court could even 
address whether Anthony had established a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination, the government cited the individual’s employment and its inability 
to determine whether he had any connection with activity that had been the subject 
of both state and federal investigations over the past two years.  Although the 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the government’s action 
constituted purposeful discrimination, id. at 93, defense counsel neither challenged 
the government’s reason nor presented to the District Court any argument that it 
should reject the government’s strike.   
   
Before us Anthony submits that the government’s reason was insufficient 
and pretextual.  But he offers no discussion of the circumstances that would 
                                                 
1  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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support a finding that the government exercised its strike on account of the 
individual’s race.  Accordingly, we review for plain error and will set aside 
Anthony’s conviction only if we conclude that the error affected his substantial 
rights.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).   
In light of the race-neutral reason offered without hesitation by the 
government and Anthony’s failure to offer any argument to demonstrate that the 
reason was pretextual, we are not convinced that Anthony actually raised a Batson 
challenge that required the Court to proceed to the third step in the Batson analysis.  
Nonetheless, assuming that the Court erred by failing to engage in Batson’s third 
step, we conclude that the error did not affect Anthony’s substantial rights given 
the circumstances before us.  
Anthony contends that the District Court also erred by denying his motion to 
suppress the police officer’s identification.  “Where a motion to suppress has been 
denied, we review the order ‘for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise 
plenary review as to its legality in the light of the court’s properly found facts.’”  
United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
“An identification procedure that is both (1) unnecessarily suggestive and 
(2) creates a substantial risk of misidentification violates due process.”  Id. (citing 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977)).  In Brathwaite, the Court 
acknowledged that “identifications arising from single-photograph displays may be 
viewed in general with suspicion.”  432 U.S. at 116 (citing Simmons v. United 
5 
 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968)).  The Court instructed, however, that the inquiry 
does not end there as “reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of 
identification testimony . . . The factors to be considered . . . include the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, 
the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the 
crime and the confrontation.  Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting 
effect of the suggestive identification itself.”  Id. at 114 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). 
Here, after hearing the testimony of Officer Dickerson, who purchased the 
crack cocaine, and Officer Paul, who conducted the surveillance video, the Court 
determined that Officer Dickerson’s identification was sufficiently reliable given 
the circumstances surrounding his observations and the subsequent identification.  
The Court specifically noted Officer Dickerson’s close attention to Anthony’s 
physical appearance, his certainty that he had identified the correct individual, and 
the fact that he cited specific details regarding Anthony’s features.  Our review of 
the record provides no basis for disturbing the District Court’s determination that 
Officer’s Dickerson’s identification was admissible at trial.   
According to Anthony, the District Court also erred by refusing to limit the 
government’s cross-examination of a defense witness, Glenn Walker, who testified 
that Brandon had informed him while in prison that Anthony had not been 
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involved.  Anthony sought to exclude reference to the fact that the conversation 
occurred while both were incarcerated.  We review a District Court’s ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010). After 
consideration of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the context of the conversation, which was relevant to 
Walker’s motive and credibility, was admissible.  
Additionally, Anthony challenges his conviction for knowingly distributing 
and possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine under Count I on the basis that 
the Court improperly amended the indictment by changing the alleged 50 grams of 
cocaine to 5 grams or more.  The government asserts that the Court permissibly 
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of distributing and possessing 
with the intent to distribute five grams of cocaine.  We review de novo a claim that 
there was a constructive amendment of the indictment.  Id. at 531.  We agree with 
the government that the District Court’s instruction on the lesser included offense 
did not constitute a constructive amendment.  United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 
317, 340 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 105 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc); Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c).  
Finally, Anthony argues that the District Court erred at sentencing by 
attributing to him an additional ten grams of cocaine based on Brandon’s 
testimony.  Anthony asserts that Brandon’s testimony failed to establish that he 
7 
 
gave this additional quantity of cocaine during the period of the conspiracy 
charged in the indictment.  For that reason, Anthony submits that the District Court 
erred by including the ten grams of cocaine base in the computation of the drug 
quantity for purposes of sentencing.   
Anthony’s argument challenges the District Court’s calculation of his 
sentencing guidelines range.  Because this raises a contention of procedural error, 
we review for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-
68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In Tomko, we noted that “an abuse of discretion has 
occurred if a district court based its decision on a clearly erroneous factual 
conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion.”  Id. at 568.  We have carefully 
reviewed the record before us and we reject Anthony’s contention of error.  After 
considering Brandon’s trial testimony and the testimony of the agent from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation about his meeting with Brandon, the District Court 
concluded that the ten grams Anthony received was not for personal use, but “was 
going to be used for sale or distribution.”  Thus, it was appropriately included in 
the drug quantity calculation as uncharged conduct that was part of the same 
course of conduct as the offense of conviction.  See Jansen v. United States, 369 
F.3d 237, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that drugs possessed for personal use 
should not be included in computation of drug quantity for offense of possessing 
with the intent to distribute).  The fact that Anthony’s receipt of the cocaine 
preceded the timeframe alleged in the indictment did not preclude the Court from 
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considering it. United States v. Stephens, 198 F.3d 389, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(noting that Sentencing Reform Act does not place any limitations on the 
information a sentencing court may consider (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661)), see also 
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399, 403 (1995) (concluding that 
consideration at sentencing of uncharged criminal conduct did not offend the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and was permissible under the sentencing guidelines). 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
